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CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE AS A SOURCE OF 
INSTITUTIONALISED WASTE IN CONSTRUCTION: 
A REVIEW, IMPLICATIONS, AND ROAD MAP FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose  
–  The construction industry has been subject to substantial criticism for its short term “hit-
and-run” relationships which are focused on win-lose situations. Despite the wide recognition 
of these problems the industry persistently resists the radical demanded of it. Therefore, the 
main purposes of this study are twofold. First, to investigate why this might be the case by 
reviewing the governance problem confronting clients and decision makers in construction 
procurement, as conceptualised in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Secondly, to critically 
analyse and question the efficiency and effectiveness of various safeguarding approaches, 
which are taken for granted and commonly practiced in construction, from a lean perspective. 
Design/methodology/approach  
–  The analysis of this paper is based on an in-depth critical review of 76 construction 
procurement and contractual related articles, ranging from 1994 to 2016, using theories of 
Lean Construction and Transaction Cost Economics as an analytical lens. 
Findings  
–  Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-
specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal 
contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures 
typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the 
project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and decision 
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makers feel they have taken the best course of action. This goes a long way to explaining the 
coherence of the current construction model. 
Research implications 
–  To the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate the usefulness 
of using principles of Lean construction in association with TCE when analysing 
construction-procurement related issues. In particular, the use of a 'lean' lens helps to expose 
the impact of procurement governance arrangements on process flow. The study also 
provides a potential research agenda that can lead to the development of prescriptive 
conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of institutionalised waste in construction. 
Practical implications  
–  The paper attempts to expose to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and 
unnecessary cost) they embed by adhering to prevailing unfit-for-purpose contractual 
governance approaches. It also helps decision makers to consider alternative procurement 
arrangements and organisational techniques that could be of value and support collaborative 
ways of working. 
Originality/value  
–  The study contributes to the overall understanding of waste in construction by providing 
insight into various  imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, which are taken-
for-granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. The findings 
presented provide a theoretical anchor and rationale for developing alternative approaches to 
the design and delivery of capital projects. 
KEYWORDS: 
Construction Procurement; Waste; Transaction Cost Economics; Lean Construction; 
Institutional Theory; Safeguarding; Contractual Governance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry is difficult, often regarded as confrontational, risk averse, and 
lacking trust and capacity for innovation and improvement (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; 
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Rooke et al., 2004; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson et al., 2008). These characteristics are 
attributed to a number of factors including fragmentation (Egan, 1998; Sarhan and Fox, 
2013); an adversarial hierarchical structure (Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011; Sarhan and 
Fox, 2013); obsolete procurement methods (Eriksson and Laan, 2007); confusing and 
treacherous contractual arrangements (Cox and Thompson, 1997; Sebastian., 2011; Hawkins, 
2012); a highly competitive, cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and the 
sequential organisation of construction processes (Koskela, 2000). The prevailing project 
procurement processes are thought to be a root-cause for these issues (Osipova and Eriksson, 
2011) and to adversely affect the extent of cooperation and trust (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). 
The lack of cooperation and trust have been identified as key areas requiring substantial 
attention and improvement (Egan, 1998, Latham 1993 & 1994) and are central to overall 
client satisfaction and project success (Love et al., 1998; Tookey et al., 2001; Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011). Matthews et al. (2003, p. 1) stress that “maximizing value and minimizing 
waste at the project level is difficult when the contractual structure inhibits coordination, 
stifles cooperation and innovation, and rewards individual contractors for both reserving 
good ideas, and optimizing their performance at the expense of others”. Adding to this, this 
study argues that procurement and contractual systems, as institutional arrangements (Sarhan 
et al., 2014), are designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and organizations 
(Love et al., 1998) at the project and programme levels; and thus structure the borders that 
shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000).  
 
Despite the many criticisms there seems to be a particular project delivery mind set 
embedded in the organisational fabric of the industry that prevails regardless of the attempts 
to address the recognised inadequacies - the question is why does this mind set prevail? In 
order to provide an answer to this question, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is used to 
begin to unpick the current inertia as according to Williamson (2000) “Any issue that arises 
as or can be reformulated as a contracting issue can be examined to advantage in 
transaction cost economizing terms” (p. 599, 608). Within construction procurement, TCE 
offers a useful mechanism to analyse conflicting interests among contracting parties (Li et al., 
2013) and to understand the hidden costs associated with pre- and post-contract work (See for 
example Li et al., 2014; Rajeh et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2016). 
 
The study will focus particularly on how self-interest drives opportunism and influences the 
governance approaches and how this becomes a dichotomy as one organisation seeks to 
4 
 
protects its interests from the opportunism of others whist continuing to exploit all 
opportunities themselves. It is proposed that one way to begin to break this seemingly 
irreconcilable and self-perpetuating cycle is to expose it as a cause of waste hitherto 
unacknowledged. Therefore, the aims of this study are two-fold. First, to review the 
governance problem confronting clients and decision makers in construction procurement, as 
conceptualised in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Secondly, to critically analyse and 
question the efficiency and effectiveness of various safeguarding approaches, which are taken 
for granted and commonly practiced in construction, from a lean perspective (i.e. the 
concepts of waste and flow as understood in lean thinking). 
 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF WASTE IN CONSTRUCTION 
The formal adaptation and transfer of the new production philosophies into construction 
projects has been ongoing since the early 1990’s (Koskela, 1992). These philosophies were 
characterised as “lean” from the study of Toyota (Krafcik, 1988), and the term ‘Lean 
Construction’ rose to prominence with the formation of the International Group for Lean 
Construction
1
 in 1993. The concept of lean was formally recommended to the UK 
construction industry by a Government report (Egan, 1998). Traditionally, the term 'waste in 
construction' is usually limited or intuitively linked to physical (material) waste. The concept 
of material waste in construction has been widely addressed but the widened understanding 
introduced by the seven process wastes identified in the Toyota Production System (TPS) 
(Ohno, 1988) has struggled to be transferred. Process waste is directly associated with 
executing tasks and conforms to the current understanding of project management as ‘a 
specific set of operations designed to accomplish a singular goal’ (Project Management 
Institute
2
). In this way, production is defined as transforming resources towards the finished 
product or project and waste can be seen as the inefficient use of resources in the execution of 
tasks. The disadvantage of this understanding of waste is that it drives the improvement of 
current processes rather than radical new system design.  
 
Koskela (2000) advances the definition of lean production to the combination of 
transformation tasks (T), flow (F) and value creation (V). This definition of production as 
                                                          
1
 www.iglc.net 
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TFV creates two additional dimensions to the conceptualisation of waste as the inefficient use 
of resources in tasks. The first additional TFV dimension, flow (F), reveals the 
interdependency of activities across the whole project process. The consideration of flow 
brings the supply chain and the logistics of getting resources to the point of transformation 
into focus. Elevating flow to a project production driver also alters the classification of 
process waste within tasks. For example, waiting within one task may now be necessary to 
expedite tasks downstream – this waiting is therefore no longer a waste and results in one 
task being sub-optimised in order to optimise the project. Consequently the pursuit of waste 
within transformation activities can itself become a cause of waste if it disrupts flow. Erratic 
and disrupted flow of processes provide further sources likely to cause waste recognised 
within TPS in two ways - the unevenness of workflow (Mura) and the related concept of the 
overburden of capacity (Muri) (Liker, 2004). 
 
The second additional TFV dimension is created by considering value creation (V) and brings 
the customer into focus. The construction sector typically identifies clients and more recently 
users and stakeholders – the term customer is not commonly used. However, the inclusion of 
value creation into project production moves the conceptualisation of waste towards 
identifying what causes value-loss and questions from whose perspective. This 
conceptualisation will vary from project to project and from customer to customer meaning 
the understanding of what constitutes value and how it is created becomes an important part 
of the design of the project production system (delivery including logistics, design and 
procurement) and the project product (the physical facility or asset created and what it 
achieves). One aspect of this conceptualisation is the consideration of the organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments that surround the design and delivery of 
construction projects. It is this aspect that leads to the primary research question:  
 
'Is there anything in the commercial and institutional environments surrounding 
construction that is blocking radical new production system design and therefore 
pinning the prevailing wasteful system in place?’  
 
A small but growing number of studies have attempted to investigate the influence of 
procurement processes on the generation of waste in construction projects (for example see 
Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009). However all of these studies have only focused on the 
relationship between different procurement systems and the generation of construction 
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material waste. In the construction management literature, there are hardly any studies that 
have sought to investigate the role played by institutional processes, within the construction 
procurement context, in embedding process waste in construction projects. 
 
The understanding of value and value loss (or waste) within these wider organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments is more difficult to determine not least because it 
requires a critical evaluation of the activities of different professions, for example lawyers, 
accountants, human resource managers, quantity surveyors to name a few. These 
environments and the professions within them also exhibit varying cultures, structures, 
systems and behaviours. Such an evaluation also needs to draw upon theory from disciplines 
outside both construction and manufacturing such as economics, law and sociology if it is to 
begin to explain the coherence and yet wastefulness of the current approaches to construction 
projects.  
 
 
To begin to answer this primary research question, the study examines the current 
commercial and institutional arrangement within construction procurement and attempts to 
analyse them through the lens of Transaction Cost Economics. The authors then provide 
some examples of prevailing wasteful and imperfect construction procurement practices. The 
term 'waste' is almost always synonymous with physical waste (i.e. on-site material waste). 
However, throughout the following sections of this paper, the term 'waste' refers to the wider 
conceptualisation of waste as summarised above. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
This paper critically reviews procurement and contractual governance theories and practices, 
over the past two decades, using mainstream management and construction management 
literature. The aim of this critical review is to contribute to the overall understanding of waste 
in construction by: 
 Providing insight into various imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, 
which are taken-for-granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in 
construction;  
 Exposing to clients and decision-makers some of the unnecessary waste they embed into 
their projects by adhering to these imperfect governance arrangements; and  
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 Providing novel explanations as to why these particular imperfect mindsets and 
governance practices prevail in construction procurement. 
 
To achieve this, a strategy had to be developed for the literature search. In general, 
researchers need to give careful consideration to the 'comprehensiveness' and 'relevance' of 
their literature review (Cronin et al., 2008). Additionally, when gathering relevant literature, 
researchers need to decide, depending on the nature and purpose of their work, whether it's 
better to include a larger and more dispersed, or smaller and more focussed number of studies 
(Guetterman, 2015). Each of these two approaches has its own merits and demerits. For 
instance, the former provides a fuller representation of existing literature on a particular 
research topic, and can potentially lead to more generalisable conclusions; failing to do this 
can undermine the statistical analysis and bias the results (Thomas and Harden, 2008). The 
latter, on the other hand, may enhance the quality and credibility placed in the conclusions, 
but makes it less easy to generalise.  
 
This study hopes to shed light on a cause of waste hitherto unacknowledged. This, therefore, 
requires entire reading of the relevant literature selected, with the aim of searching for latent 
themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This interpretative work entails a thorough review of the 
underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualisations informing the content of the data. For 
this reason, a generic purposive sampling strategy (Bryman, 2012) was adopted for literature 
review. This strategy is not driven by the statistical imperative of including every available 
study. Instead, it puts the research questions under investigation at the forefront of sampling 
considerations (Bryman, 2012). According to Doyle (2003, p. 326), a purposive sample is 
more appropriate than an exhaustive one, when the aim is explanation rather than prediction. 
Through this approach, the researcher decides what needs to be known, and deliberately 
chooses suitable literature which can potentially provide the most relevant information and 
have the largest impact on the enhancement of knowledge (Patton, 2015, p.276).  As clarified 
by Thomas and Harden (2008), the results of a conceptual analysis will not change "if ten 
rather than five studies contain the same concept, but will depend on the range of concepts 
found in the studies". Based on these considerations, the study adopted the following 
approaches for identifying the relevant literature material: 
 Targeting peer-reviewed papers published by top journals using electronic search engines 
(e.g. University's Library OneSearch and Google Scholar) and hand-searching referred 
8 
 
conference papers (e.g. ARCOM, CIB W92 Procurement Systems, and Annual 
Conference of the International Group for Lean Construction). The main keywords and 
topics that were searched for and reviewed included: preconstruction services, 
construction project governance, hidden transaction costs in construction projects, impact 
of procurement on project outcomes, relationship between procurement and waste (i.e. 
value loss), contractual governance, misuse of contracts, opportunistic practices, barriers 
to partnering, barriers to relational forms of contracting, barriers to lean and integrated 
project delivery, and changing roles of clients and professional service providers. 
 
As a result of this effort, 76 construction procurement and contractual related articles, ranging 
from 1994 to 2016, were identified and thoroughly reviewed. When qualitatively analysing 
the articles, a table of information, that categorises information extracted from each paper, 
was created to help the authors with organising their thoughts (See Appendix 1). 
 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT PROCUREMENT 
The organisational, commercial and institutional environments that underpin project 
production are enshrined within the project procurement processes and cover every aspect of 
setting up the transaction from identifying the business case and funding through to the 
appointment of consultants, contractors and suppliers. In general, increased trustful 
collaboration between project parties is argued to be an appropriate remedy for many of the 
industry’s challenges (See for example Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 
2011; Walker et al., 2017). According to Vilasini et al. (2011), selecting a suitable 
procurement system for a particular project is vital for overall productivity of the project, and 
is one of the most important decisions that a project owner makes in the development of a 
project. They suggested that procurement systems should be the key starting point for the 
customisation of lean principles for the construction industry. Oyegoke et al. (2009), suggest 
that construction procurement can be applied to project management processes as a means of 
defining how production will take place, or as part of the production process as to when, 
where and how resources could be sourced. Similarly, Pekuri et al. (2014) argue that 
procurement procedures shape the form of the project-organization and the commercial terms 
binding the project parties; and thus that way they set the boundaries for the functioning of 
the project operational system (i.e. onsite project delivery). This means that in order to 
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optimise a project delivery system, we must align procurement and contractual arrangements 
with the project’s operational system.  
 
Due to the difficult nature of many construction projects, clients and decision makers, in 
practice, tend to allocate risks and seek to safeguard their project-specific investments and 
assets, from exploitation and opportunism, through the deployment of formal governance 
mechanisms contained within the contractual arrangements. This applies to all parties across 
the project chain from high level project funders through to raw material suppliers. Since, 
most of the clients who procure construction projects lack experience and may only ever 
build once or twice (Love et al., 2010); they invariably seek advice from lawyers and from 
those who are familiar with construction contracts and the laws related to them (e.g. quantity 
surveyors). These lawyers or consultants are accordingly paid, as part of their agreed fees, for 
providing means for safeguarding their client’s rights and transaction-specific assets. 
Unsurprisingly, in some cases these means can, for example, include the use of privileged 
conditions of contract, where clients may not mind protecting themselves from any risks, 
even if, this occurs at the expense of others.  
 
However, in most cases, the intention for or on behalf of client’s (experienced or not) is to 
control opportunism and utilise efficient governance of the transaction. Additionally there 
may be little awareness of how these procurement decisions and arrangements may affect the 
likelihood of creating a cooperative environment (Eriksson et al., 2008) and thus impact on 
project performance and outcomes. In most cases the client advisers are not incentivised to 
adopt less familiar procurement arrangements that are potentially more efficient than 
conventional approaches Eriksson et al., 2008) due to institutional pressure (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Sarhan et al., 2014). Pekuri et al. (2014, p. 39) sought to analyse and 
conceptualise the problem of procurement in construction and concluded that a more 
profound questioning of current practice is needed.  
 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS 
It is Coase’s seminal article "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) which explicitly introduced the 
concept of transaction costs into economic analysis; by drawing attention to transaction costs 
that had been assumed to be zero in prior theorizing. Williamson and his fellows have 
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subsequently added refinements to Coase's general arguments (see e.g., Williamson, 1975, 
1985, 2000; North, 1994). Transaction costs are the costs of specifying what is being 
exchanged and of enforcing the consequent agreements (i.e. contractual clauses) against the 
exchange partner (North, 1994; Ting et al., 2007). Williamson (1975) categorises transaction 
costs into ex-ante and ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs comprise the costs of tendering, 
negotiating and writing the contract (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997); while ex-post costs 
include the costs of: monitoring and measuring performance, implementing quality control 
systems, cost accounting, establishing layers of the managerial hierarchy, and dispute 
resolution processes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  Dietrich (1994, p. 33) classifies 
transaction costs into: 
 Information-seeking costs – these refer to the investment of time, effort and other 
resources associated with researching possible alternatives (Tate et al., 2014); 
 Bargaining and decision related costs – the costs of developing an agreement, 
negotiating, documenting, selecting potential exchange partners and establishing a 
contract (Tate et al., 2014); 
 Enforcement related costs – e.g. management, inspection and monitoring costs as well as 
costs incurred to resolve disputes arising from the contracted work (Walker and Wing, 
1999; Tate et al., 2014). 
 
According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), Williamson's (1975, 1985) micro analytical 
framework of TCE, is underpinned by the interaction between two fundamental assumptions 
of human behaviour (opportunism and bounded rationality) and two key dimensions of 
transactions (asset specificity and uncertainty). The complete TCA framework also includes 
risk neutrality as a third behavioural assumption, and transaction frequency or relational 
exchange as a third transactional dimension (Williamson, 1985).  
 
Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile". This 
implies that given the opportunity, decision makers may deceitfully seek to serve their self-
interests. Muris (1981, p. 521, cited in Ting et al., 2007) claims that opportunism arises when 
a party “behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding of their contract, but not 
necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from 
one party to the other.” In reality, opportunistic behaviours are part of human nature, and 
therefore they often exist in exchange-relationships (Ting et al., 2007). However, it can be 
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argued that although opportunism may, initially, lead to increased outcomes for the 
opportunistic party, it may equally have the potential to restrict value creation and decrease 
revenues for both parties in a relationship (Wang and Yang, 2013). This is because 
considerable amounts of resource have to be spent on enforcing, monitoring and controlling 
functions instead of employing those resources for productive purposes (Ting et al., 2007).  
 
Bounded rationality simply means that decision makers act rationally but have constraints on 
their cognitive, analytical and data-processing capabilities, especially in uncertain and 
complex environments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Walker and Wing, 1999). According to 
Dietrich (1994: 19), the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ in transactions is based on two 
principles. First, that there are limits on the human ability to process information without 
error. Secondly, that it is not wise to suggest that past experience can help in every situation 
encountered. Asset specificity refers to investments (transaction specific assets) that have a 
‘lock-in effect’ (Tang et al., 2007) because they make it difficult to terminate a relationship 
and select other parties without acquiring losses. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) suggest that 
assets with high level of specificity can be regarded as sunk costs; because they have little or 
no value outside the focal exchange relationship (Williamson, 1985). There are six main 
types of asset specificity as identified by Williamson (1991, cited in Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997): (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset (e.g. plant) specificity, (3) human asset 
specificity (4) brand name capital, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) temporal specificity.  
 
Uncertainty can be defined in its simplest form as what is known in comparison to what 
needs to be known. During transactions (ex-ante and ex-post contractual stages), two types of 
uncertainty are encountered: behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. TCE 
conceptualises ‘behavioural uncertainty’ as the amount of difficulty associated with 
monitoring and evaluating the performance of the exchange partners against established 
contractual agreements (Williamson, 1985); while ‘environmental uncertainty’ is theorised as 
unanticipated changes in circumstances and the associated complexity surrounding the 
transaction context (Williamson, 1985). In short, TC theory assumes that the greater the 
transaction uncertainty and asset specificity and the lower the transaction frequency, the 
higher is the transaction costs (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). It also suggests that exchange 
cannot be fully specified ex ante, and that contractual performance cannot be easily verified 
ex post, due to bounded rationality and uncertainty factors (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
Therefore, Williamson developed Coase’s theory further to suggest that economic agents 
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should primarily seek to economise on transaction costs (Lingard et al., 1998) by deploying 
efficient governance structures and strategies. 
 
Having provided an explanation to the theory’s constructs and main assumptions; next the 
study presents a discussion about the consequences of the interplay that occurs between these 
constructs, which in turn lead to a number of governance challenges. 
THE SAFEGUARDING PROBLEM AND THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
According to the theory of TCE, there are three main types of governance problems that 
occur during transactions (Williamson, 1985). These are: 
 The safeguarding problem; 
 The adaptation problem; 
 The performance-evaluation problem. 
 
A ‘safeguarding problem’ arises when a firm deploys transaction-specific assets and worries 
that its exchange-partner may opportunistically try to exploit these unique investments 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be concluded that asset specificity and 
opportunism are the antecedents of the safeguarding problem. Figure 1 is a conceptual 
representation of these governance problems and possible solutions. 
Figure 1: A conceptual model of transactional governance problems and solutions 
 
According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), the basic premise of TC analysis is that if the 
three governance problems described above are absent or low, decision-makers will 
accordingly favour market governance to vertical integration (the make-or-buy decision). 
Alternatively, if the transaction costs required for overcoming the governance problems 
exceed the production cost advantages of the market, firms will favour internal organization 
(Coase, 1937).  
Figure 2. The “Buy or Make” decision factors 
McNeil (1985) introduced the concept of ‘relational thinking’ in legal scholarship as a more 
positive and sustaining form of governance. This can be used to augment the conventional 
approach to transaction economising and solves governance problems through behavioural 
norms rather than potential sanctions (Ting et al, 2007).  
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TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Winch, 1989; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997) 
because it assumes that transactions will be adequately governed by the institutional 
arrangements that are most efficient (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). According to North and 
Davis (1971, pp. 6-7; emphasis in original), cited in Williamson (1990): “An institutional 
arrangement is an arrangement between economic units that governs the way these units can 
cooperate and/or compete. It.[can] provide a structure within which its members can 
cooperate…or [it can] provide a mechanism that can effect a change in law or property 
rights”. This implies that, according to TCE, the institutional arrangement chosen will be that 
which reduces the total costs (transactional or organizational costs plus production costs) of 
undertaking and coordinating those activities (Chau and Walker, 1994). When applied to 
construction clients deploying their procurement arrangements in general, and governance 
techniques and approaches in specific, this suggests they should also consider the impact of 
their decisions on a project-team’s performance and total costs. Not to do so might mean a 
cheaper transactional arrangement leading to a disproportionately higher production cost. 
This idea now contradicts the previous suggestion that economic agents should primarily seek 
to economise on transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). These contradictions, therefore, 
indicate that it is insufficient to expect that the most economic transactional arrangements 
will implicitly lead to the most efficient institutional arrangements.  
 
Having, provided a review to the ‘safeguarding problem’ as conceptualised in TCE, next the 
study presents a critical discussion upon a number of imperfect safeguarding approaches that 
are commonly practiced in construction. 
 
IMPERFECT SAFEGUARDING APPROACHES COMMONLY USED IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
The prevailing transaction approach taken in construction conforms to the “buy it” type of 
governance where contractual and governance instruments are often adapted from other 
transactions and performance is evaluated through stringent conditions agreed in advance. In 
this way, it is anticipated that risks and uncertainties are captured and managed and parties 
are protected from the opportunistic exploitation of these risks and uncertainties by these 
governance arrangements. This prevails even though the high transaction cost, asset 
specificity and uncertainty mean that a vertically integrated “make-it” or production-led 
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approach is more appropriate where interests are protected through “in-house” or “hybrid” 
production (see Fig.2). The prevailing approaches for the management of projects and 
arrangement of transactions are widely documented by professional institutions, for example 
PMI
3
, RICS
4
, CIPS
5
 among others. So the contradictory position seems to apply to the 
execution of many types of projects. However, one project domain which conforms more to 
the “make it” type of governance would seem to be film and theatre production although it is 
not investigated here. 
 
In the construction industry the contradictory position is compounded by the prevailing 
institutional arrangements in which the asset specificity and low transaction frequency creates 
an opportunistic culture resulting in a myriad safeguarding approaches. When these 
safeguarding approaches are viewed through a "lean" lens, it can be observed that they are 
imperfect and create waste. Some of the commonly used safeguarding approaches are now 
discussed. 
 
STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT  
Construction parties rely heavily on contract formalisation through the use of standard forms 
of contracts (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Theoretically, standard forms of contract optimise the 
balance of risk and responsibilities between the parties, and eliminate ex-ante transactional 
costs required for re-drafting and getting familiar with new contracts (Cox and Thompson, 
1997). Their main advantage is that they enable a body of experience in their use to be 
developed among the whole industry (Williamson et al., 2004). This includes the formation 
of an established body of case law which can assist in the drafting and interpretation of 
contracts (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Thus, as a safeguarding technique, they are supposed to 
reduce the amount of time and risk involved for contract administrators and tenderers as well. 
However, there are many problems related to the use of standard forms of contract. These 
forms of contract are drafted by third parties who focused their formulation of the contracts 
on specific types of projects; thus one of the main problems associated with the use of un-
amended standard forms of contract is their inability to adapt to the context in which they 
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operate (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Nevertheless, in practice, clients rarely use standard-
form contracts without making some amendments to them (Laryea and Hughes, 2009), and 
the same applies to subcontracts (Greenwood, 2001).  
 
A study by Laryea and Hughes (2009) which was based on four observational case studies in 
two of the top contracting companies in the UK, showed that these amendment made by 
clients are mostly related to payment issues and legal arrangements. Similarly, an exploratory 
study of 11 Swedish construction projects, by Opisova and Erksson (2011), reported that in 
all 11 projects, clients made amendments to the general conditions of contract to transfer 
more risks to the contractor; many of them were applied to the length of guarantee and 
additional insurance. Laryea and Hughes (2009) revealed that a general perception exists 
among contractors that clients, actually, amend conditions of standard contracts and introduce 
their own special clauses, in order to gain an advantage rather than genuinely to suit the 
project needs. Additionally, Hawkins (2012) warns us that users making amendments to 
standard forms of contract at negotiation stages do not always ensure that all the interlinked 
clauses affected by the amendments are also amended. Thus, in the absence of trust and 
collaboration, any amendments to contract conditions may lead to ambiguities and encourage 
opportunistic behaviour. Actually, a study by Love et al. (2010) identified onerous and one 
sided amendments to standard forms, often drafted by lawyers to improve their clients’ 
position, as one of the underlying dynamic factors influencing disputes.  
 
A number of studies show compounding factors by verifying that some contract conditions 
(i.e. FIDIC, 1999 and NEC, 1993) are very difficult to read, and require at least college-level 
reading skills to correctly interpret them (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007; Rameezdeen 
and Rodrigo, 2013). At the same time, it is important to emphasise that lawyers and specialist 
surveyors are not the primary users of a contract (Sarhan et al., 2014); it is the project parties’ 
ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for contract performance (Rameezdeen 
and Rodrigo, 2013). In general, textual complexity of standard forms of contract, in terms of 
readability and comprehensiveness, may lead to misinterpretation and lack of common 
understanding between project parties; thus supporting arms’ length relationships and 
potential time-consuming and costly disputes (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007).  
 
Additionally, one of the major critiques concerning the adoption of standard form of contracts 
is associated with the dominance of adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms within many 
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of these contracts (Mante et al., 2012). Furthermore, the availability of adjudication clauses 
as contained in standard forms of contract make disputes a less disruptive action for the 
parties concerned (Love et al., 2010); thereby hindering collaboration efforts. In a study by 
Mante et al. (2012) which aimed to review the influence of procurement methods on dispute 
resolution mechanism choice in construction, it was found that almost all traditional 
procurement contracts in the UK (e.g. JCT standard building contracts (2005) and the NEC3 
Engineering and Construction contract) offer adjudication, arbitration and litigation as the 
primary dispute resolution mechanisms. In contrast, standard forms of contract for Project 
Partnering (i.e. PPC 2000) promote a clear preference for non-adversarial methods of dispute 
resolution, by providing a problem-solving hierarchy that starts with the client’s 
representative and ends with legislation as the final means of determining the dispute (Mante 
et al., 2012). The use of the multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism ensures that 
relationship-based approaches to resolving disputes are exhausted prior to the use of any 
adversarial methods. Similarly, Alliancing Contracts in Australia include a “no dispute” 
clause, in which project participants agree to use an alliance board for  resolving all disputes 
as an alternative approach to arbitration or litigation (Jones, 2000). This allows project 
participants to resolve any conflicts or issues on site and within the project team, and 
consequently facilitates earlier settlement of final account (Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2004). 
 
In summary, it seems that the problems of standard forms of contract outweigh their 
advantages. The heavy reliance on the use of standard forms of contract, established by third 
parties, brings with it lots of formality and rigidity that stifles cooperation and focuses on the 
individual parties and their responsibilities; thereby driving a distance between project parties 
and encouraging opportunistic behaviour (Eriksson et al. 2008).According to Cox and 
Thompson (1997, p. 132): 
 “…Standard forms of contract are nothing more than instruments used by the parties 
to seek strict liability and attach blame to events as they occur. Nevertheless, the 
industry's hands are tied to the standard forms and their traditional methods of 
contracting, even though they do not deliver satisfactory results. These methods, when 
linked with the prevailing adversarial culture and fragmented structure lead the 
parties away from 'trust' towards self-seeking interest ('opportunism')”. 
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Nonetheless, Eriksson and Laan (2007) suggest that the deep-rooted practice of using 
standard contracts construction is only harmful, if they are used as “safeguards” in the 
absence of strong “relational norms”. Without good relationships between the project-parties, 
once a default occurs, they are most likely to refer back to the clauses of the standard contract 
which, in turn, may encourage opportunism and lead to adversarial ways of working (i.e. 
remedies of damages through legal actions). Therefore, it could be argued that the criticism is 
not about the use of standard forms of contracts; but it is about what is being standardised 
within these contracts, as well as how people interpret and choose to use contracts. Partnering 
and alliancing are regarded as practical examples of "relational contracting" (RC) principles 
(Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2004). RC-based approaches seem to offer a cost-effective means 
of achieving total project cost minimisation through encouraging mutual trust, collaboration 
and joint management of risks (See for example Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2002a&b, 2004; 
Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011).  
 
DISCLAIMER, EXCULPATORY AND PRIVILEGED CLAUSES OF CONTRACT 
Shifting project risks to other contracting parties is a general practice in the construction 
industry (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003), which may lead to cost wastage and opportunistic 
behaviours (Clegg, 1992). It is common practice for clients to exert most project risk, if not 
all, on contractors and designers (Ahmed et al., 1999; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011), in order 
to have more control whilst passing responsibility (Sarhan et al., 2014). This is achieved 
through the use of disclaimer clauses or exculpatory language in contract conditions for risk 
allocation and as a safeguard. In 12 case-studies, by Smith and Bohn (1999), which aimed to 
investigate the factors which influence the assumptions of risk and the use of contingency by 
small-medium construction firms, it was reported that “on many occasions designers work 
with owners who believe it is the design engineer’s obligation to protect them against all 
project risks using whatever exculpatory language they can find in defence of their position 
(p. 102).An example of this includes expressing ‘fitness for purpose obligations’ on project-
parties in the contract. Such proposed forms of warranty, which are used to the employer's 
advantage, are described by Hawkins (2012) as ‘weasel clauses’ that most insurers will 
eschew. 
 
An empirical survey that was conducted in the Canadian and the United States construction 
industries by Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) revealed that inappropriate risk allocation 
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through disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses in contracts is a major reason for increasing the total 
cost of a project. The study reported that, under all circumstances, whenever disclaimer 
clauses existed in contracts, contractors always added risk premiums to the total cost of a 
project in order to safeguard themselves against these clauses. These attached premiums 
ranged between 8% and 20% of the total cost of the project, depending on various factors 
including their relationship with the owner, contract type and fairness. According to Zaghloul 
and Hartman (2003), the most common exculpatory clauses used in construction contracts in 
descending order are: Uncertainty of work conditions; Indemnification; Delaying events; 
Sufficiency in contract documents; and Liquidated damages. Adding to this list is ‘Site access 
disclaimer clauses’. Site access is classified by Smith and Bohn (1999) as an internal, 
predictable and contractual type of risk that falls within the responsibility of the owner. This 
type of risk can shared and planned-ahead to secure access; instead of being pushed to 
contractors in the form of disclaimer clauses, leading to unnecessary additional costs (in the 
form of insurance or contingencies, adversarial relationships and potential claims and 
disputes. 
 
In short, it is obvious that ‘disclaimer or exculpatory clauses’ often used by clients as 
‘safeguards’ may lead to increased costs of projects in the form of unnecessary contingencies 
and insurances (Cost wastage), restricted bid-competitions ( waste of human potential), and 
potential (timely-consuming) disputes. Compellingly, despite all of these, “disclaimer clauses 
continue to be used in some of the newer contractual agreements between owners and 
contractors such as partnering/alliances” (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003, pp. 422). 
 
CONVENTIONAL INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS  
Typically, a client would wish to obtain the broadest possible insurance protection from 
project-parties against any loss arising from a project (Cushman, 2003). If insurance 
requirements are too lenient, client's loss exposures may not be covered sufficiently. If 
requirements are set too stringent (e.g. to cover any losses even if even if the fault is caused 
in whole or in part by the indemnified party), the client may have to pay for additional 
premiums or unnecessary contract costs (Cushman, 2003). In general, main contractors 
usually follow the same approach when dealing with their project-supply-chain. However, It 
has been suggested by expert construction professionals that conventional arrangements for 
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providing insurance cover add unnecessary costs to constructions projects, and can also 
obstruct collaboration between supply chains (Ndekugri et al., 2013).  
 
This wasted cost, ultimately met by the owner/client, arises through duplication in insurance 
cover as stakeholders’ policies overlap in the risks that they cover (Ndekugri et al., 2013; 
Mossman et al., 2010). Furthermore, the conventional practice of insuring the liabilities of 
individual project participants rather than the project risks themselves often leads to defensive 
attitudes between project participants; thereby hindering supply chain collaboration (Ibid.). In 
a survey study (Kent and Becerik Gerber, 2010) completed by 415 practitioners, traditional 
insurance products were identified, based on the respondents opinions, as a main barrier to 
integrated project delivery (IDP). Subsequently, Ghassemi, and Becerik-Gerber (2011) 
conducted a qualitative investigation, through nine IPD construction projects in the United 
States, and revealed that the biggest worry for leading industry professionals concerning 
adopting IPD to its full capacity is insurance and liability issues; as it was found that 
insurance products impose liability issues on each project-party separately and thus make 
collaboration complicated. According to Mossman et al. (2010, p. 11): 
"If each party to a relational agreement is required to have its own insurance and 
there is a claim during design or construction, an insurance company could force 
parties to sue one another in order to trigger insurance coverage, threatening 
relationships".  
 
It seems to us, therefore, that a 'project insurance' option (Ndekugri et al., 2013) could be an 
efficient and effective alternative model which enables project participants to optimize the 
project risks as-a-whole. A single project insurance model may incur higher ex-ante costs 
than conventional ones; but would fill insurance gaps and reduce the need for litigations and 
dispute procedures often conducted to determine which member of the supply chain to blame 
once a damage or loss occurs; thereby leading to enhanced collaboration and work-flow and 
reduced post-ante costs. That being said, it is important to stress that in order to reap the full 
benefits of project insurance arrangements, there would be a crucial need need for making 
project insurance a mainstream option, so that it can become an industry norm. 
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COLLATERAL WARRANTIES 
Collateral warranties are well established, in the construction industry, as contracts which are 
collateral to the main agreement between project parties. The main objective for their use is 
to safeguard those parties with a financial interest in the building from any consequent losses 
arising out of building defects which appear after practical completion (Wordley, 1991). They 
usually provide a direct contractual linkage between the producing parties and those parties 
who have long-term interest in the building once it is completed (i.e. the owner, the occupier 
and the financier) (Hawkins, 2012). Many forms of these collateral contracts provide that the 
rights and benefits of the warrant (guarantee given) may be passed on, at least twice, to 
subsequent interested parties (Hawkins, 2012; Wordley, 1991).  
 
The construction industry, in particular the property sector, has been and is still subject to 
considerable growth in the use of collateral warranties, which are seen as taken for granted 
safeguards in procurement arrangements. However, little attention has been focussed on 
assessing their true costs (Wordley, 1991). Putting into consideration the fragmented nature 
of the construction industry, the predominance of outsourcing, and the way in which most 
construction projects are procured involving large numbers of project-participants (e.g. 
architects, consultants, contractors, sub-contractors, specialist suppliers), it is obvious that the 
number of collateral contracts that interested parties must obtain in order to protect 
themselves is enormous. Each of these collateral warranties requires careful drafting by 
lawyers, and each concerned party seeks involving its own lawyer in negotiating the content 
and extent of the warranty (Ibid.). Thereby, leading to substantial transactional costs and 
additional management time spent in co-ordinating the responses. It is also worth noting that 
when design consultants provide collateral warrantee, additional premiums are factored into 
their professional indemnity insurance to cover their extension of liability (Ibid.); thus 
increasing the overall cost of the insurance on any one project. 
 
Additionally, there are serious concerns about the ability of the collateral warranty matrix to 
meet the interested parties’ objectives in seeking them (Wordley, 1991). First, the assets 
backing the warranties are not guaranteed. If the contractor or subcontractor providing the 
warrantee becomes insolvent, the value of the remedy gets destroyed. As for the designer 
consultant, the asset backing the collateral warranty is the consultant's professional indemnity 
insurance, which is annually renewed based on a claims-made basis. There are many events, 
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at which professional indemnity insurance policies may fail to respond to submitted claims 
(Ibid.). This includes for example, "exhaustion of the insured's policy limits during the year 
in which the claim under the warranty was notified due to the policy limits being applied to 
another claim, also notified during that period" (Wordley, 1991, p. 237). This incident for 
example is outside the influence or control of the collateral warranty recipient, and indicates 
the difficulties inherent in relying on the consultant's professional indemnity insurance as an 
asset that backs collateral warrantees.  
 
Secondly, under collateral warranties, the recipient of the warranty 'must' be able to prove 
breach of contract by the provider of the warranty for there to be any recovery (Wordley, 
1991). This implies the use of costly and time consuming litigation which is by no means an 
acceptable remedy. It therefore appears to us that the latent defect insurance (LDI) options 
may be a better alternative to collateral warranties. The LDI option provides compensation to 
the project-parties as a whole without reference to their contractual liabilities; and thus 
removes the need for any affected party to dispute the issue at fault and to assign blame with 
a resultant costly delay (Wordley, 1991).  
 
THE NEED FOR EMBEDDING TRUST IN CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT 
According to TCE, economic actors should seek to overcome the 'safeguarding problem' that 
arises during transactions by selecting an efficient governance structure (Figure 1). 
Williamson (1985) developed a theoretical model for the choice of an optimal governance 
structure for six different types of transaction, depending on their asset specificity and 
frequency. In general, TCE researchers have conceptualized three general types of 
governance structure (i.e. market, hierarchies and hybrid/intermixed) which map into price, 
authority and trust respectively (Williamson, 1985). A comprehensive review by Rindfleisch 
and Heide (1997), which provided an integration and synthesis of 45 empirical TCA articles, 
found that the use of vertical integration as a means of safeguarding specific assets from 
possible opportunistic behaviour is broadly confirmed amongst researchers. However, it was 
also demonstrated in the reviewed studies that firms can also protect their specific assets by 
deploying a variety of hybrid governance mechanisms, such as partnering, prequalifications, 
and the development of relational norms. Eriksson (2006) developed a TCE-based 
procurement model based on Williamson's (1985) optimal governance model (Figure 3) and 
argued that: 
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"According to Williamson (1985), the construction of plant facilities is a typical 
occasional transaction involving high asset specificity, i.e. a type five transaction. 
Overall, most construction projects are of that type. However, some projects are 
significantly less complex than constructing a plant, for example production of small 
houses with modular construction. Such projects may be categorized as transactions 
of type 3 or 4. For construction projects in general, the model prescribes medium 
emphasis on authority, medium to high trust, and low to medium emphasis on price" 
(Eriksson, 2006, pp. 10-11). 
 
In Eriksson (2006)'s conceptual study, he suggested that TCE's three main governance 
mechanisms (i.e. price, authority and trust) are strongly linked to three different types of 
control (i.e. output, process and social control). This implies, according to Eriksson and Laan 
(2007) that clients can facilitate different levels of price, authority and trust in a transaction 
relationship through the selection and use of these different types of control. In other words, 
it is argued by them that clients' chosen procurement procedures and arrangements involve 
different types of control, which in turn affect the levels of price, authority, and/or trust 
embedded within a project. For instance, they suggested that bid evaluations which focus on 
tender price represent a price focus through 'output control'; while bid evaluations which 
focus on trust-based soft parameters represent a trust focus through 'social control'. It is 
however important to note that according to Tookey et al. (2001), in practice, clients do not 
adhere to rigid prescriptive procurement guidance and definitions, which regard construction 
procurement as a set of rationalistic decisions taking place within a closed environment 
(mechanistic-thinking approach); instead counterintuitive decisions are the norm, leading to 
the formation of hybrid structures. 
Figure 3: Eriksson's (2006) TCE-based procurement model for governance choice 
 
DISCUSSION  
In construction, there seems to be two general approaches to selecting a procurement system. 
The first would focus on designing a project organisation structure including a project 
operating system based on project needs and priorities, and then adapting a contractual 
arrangement that aligns the commercial interests of the project parties (e.g. Thomsen et al., 
2010) - a production oriented approach which aims to design and enhance flow processes 
(Koskela and Sharpe, 1994).  The second is a risk based approach which is mainly concerned 
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with overcoming transactional governance problems (see Fig. 1), and considers 'risk' to be the 
main criterion influencing procurement selection decisions. Advocators of this approach (e.g. 
Hibberd and Basden, 1996), cited in Love et al. (1998), suggest that contractual arrangements 
should be primarily conducted for risk allocation and mitigation purposes, in that way 
determining the type of the procurement method that would fulfil the client’s objectives. 
Thus, a debate exists in literature upon whether procurement arrangements should be adapted 
to support production system requirements or tailored to transactional characteristics.  
 
TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Winch, 1989; Walker and Wing, 1999). It 
aims to reduce both transaction and production costs (total costs). TCE, however, recognises 
that making decisions about government structures encompasses a trade-off between 
transaction and production costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). A review of 45 empirical TC 
analysis articles, published from 1982 to 1996, revealed that discrepancy exists among 
scholars about deciding on whether transaction or production costs have a stronger impact on 
the choice of governance structures (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Two subsequent studies 
by Koskela and Ballard (2006, 2012), which aimed to criticise the underestimation of the idea 
of production in construction management and economic theories, claimed that TCE lacks a 
proper conceptualization of production and waste; and criticised Williamson’s (1985) work 
due to its weak and biased justification against the optimality assumption. This simply infers 
that no matter how efficient the governance structure chosen is, there is no optimal/perfect 
structure. Thus, the extent of non-optimality is waste that needs to be tackled through 
economising on production activities. Finally, they concluded by stressing that an “economic 
organization should aim at minimization of the sum of transaction and production costs, 
given that different kinds of transactions and productive activities are more efficiently 
governed by different modes of governance” (Koskela and Ballard, 2012, p. 731).  
 
In construction, there is no ready-made product to buy (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Both the 
client and the project-supply-chain have to interact in order to create the final product. Hence, 
there are substantial trends towards collaborative ways of working as a means for improving 
project outcomes; it is therefore important to consider how construction clients and 
companies tend to protect (safeguard) their project-specific assets, against opportunism, 
during procurement procedures. Very little, if any studies, have sought to question the 
efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards crafted by contracting parties in construction 
procurement. This is an important question as there are trends towards collaborative ways of 
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working as a means for improving project outcomes.  Based on a critical literature review, 
this study identified various safeguarding approaches (Table 1) and analysed their impact on 
project performance and outcomes (Figure 4).  
 
Table 1: A categorisation of various safeguarding approaches within construction 
procurement according to their underpinning theoretical perspective and level of prevalence 
Conventional  safeguarding approaches 
based on 'risk allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches 
based on 'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements/products Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
 
As critically discussed earlier, these 'risk averse' safeguarding approaches based on 
transactional considerations offer little incentive for cooperation to emerge; instead they 
entrench wasteful processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle (e.g. 
opportunism, unnecessary premiums, claims and disputes), as shown in Figure 4. By tailoring 
procurement decisions to 'transactional' characteristics, clients (or focal companies) 
concentrate on formal risk allocation, through contractual arrangements, in an attempt to 
maximise their own profits; thereby neglecting the significance of maintaining and enhancing 
the flow of production processes, and overlooking the interdependency between project 
partners in their efforts to maximise value. For these reasons, we stress that procurement 
arrangements should be crafted to suit the chosen project delivery system and improve flow 
processes, rather than being tailored to transactional characteristics and dictated by the 
selected contract type. 
Figure 4: General potential impacts of the use of imperfect safeguarding approaches on 
project performance and outcomes -Modified from  Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) 
 
This study was driven by a primary research question that led the authors to examine the 
current commercial and institutional environment surrounding construction. Through a 
critical literature review, it was found that very few studies have sought to challenge the 
phenomenon of coherence within the current prevailing construction business and project 
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delivery models. In a primary attempt to explore this gap in knowledge, work by Sarhan et al. 
(2014) introduced the concept of 'institutional waste' within the construction industry and 
provided five propositions for future empirical investigation. In principal, they argued that the 
construction industry accedes to imperfect institutional processes, in the form of habitual, 
imitation or compliance, in order to achieve social fitness (i.e. legitimacy, survival and 
stability) at the price of production efficiency and effectiveness. They defined the terms 
'habitual' as adhering to invisible, widely shared and taken for granted norms that have been 
historically repeated; 'imitation' as consciously or unconsciously mimicking what other more 
successful organisations do and strictly following imperfect advice from consulting firms and 
professional institutions; and 'compliance' as obeying imperfect institutional requirements 
(e.g. imposing more control in contracts and structural arrangements as a response to 
problems of a lack of trust).  
 
Subsequently, another study by Sarhan et al. (2016) provided empirical data around the 
critiques of the role and production effectiveness of Tier 1 contractors. They also presented  
examples of practices that open debate on how to challenge prevailing procurement models 
for construction. Through literature review and interviews with a number of UK industry 
experts, they discussed the factors influencing the ‘Principal-Agent’ relationship 
demonstrating how that institutional forces (e.g. vested interests and bargaining strength of 
major industry players) can have an influence on shaping procurement practices. According 
to them: 
 "Procurement arrangements often mirror institutional forces. These forces do not 
necessarily guarantee better value services, they are more likely to serve the interests 
of large industry players with the bargaining power to create new rules" (Sarhan et 
al., 2016, pp. 1) 
 
By reviewing three governance problems in construction procurement as conceptualised in 
theory of TCE, this study shows that whilst safeguarding is critical in construction projects, 
the drive towards economising the transaction cost moves the institutional arrangements 
away from effective 'safeguarding' towards the use of cheaper 'adaptation' and 'performance 
evaluation' as governance methods. This explains why the construction industry persists in 
using the market or “buying” as a solution to project delivery and leads to imperfect 
safeguarding. The outcome of imperfect safeguarding, as illustrated in Figure 4, is a lack of 
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control on opportunistic behaviours and the reduced effectiveness of in-house or cooperative 
arrangements. Based on this study's literature review and critical evaluation of the 
safeguarding problem in construction procurement, and building on the work of Sarhan et al. 
(2014 and 2016), the following explanations to the reasons for the persistence of imperfect 
governance practices in construction procurement are offered (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Institutional  factors influencing the choice of imperfect procurement arrangements 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is no doubt that inappropriate procurement arrangements may lead to time and cost 
overruns, adversarial relationships between project parties, and ultimately the failure of 
projects (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 1998; Watermeyer, 2012). In general, increased 
collaboration and mutual trust between project parties, to support and enhance production 
flow, has been argued to be a suitable remedy for many of the industry’s problems (see for 
example Latham 1993 & 1994; Egan, 1998). These substantial arguments, amongst others, 
led to the development of various collaborative and relational forms of contracting that have 
been used across different countries worldwide (e.g. Partnering in the UK, Alliances in 
Australia, and IPD in USA) with varying levels of success. Compellingly, various empirical 
studies (see for example Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Kent, and Becerik-Gerber, 2010; 
Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011) revealed that the use of risk-averse safeguarding 
governance arrangements is prevalent to an extent that they continue to be utilised in some of 
the newer relational contractual agreements such as partnering, alliances and IPD.  
 
 
This study examined the reasons for the occurrence and prevalence of these imperfect 
safeguarding governance practices in construction procurement. Based on a critical analysis, 
the study argued that procurement arrangements should be crafted to support production 
system requirements and improve flow processes, rather than being based on cost and risk-
averse considerations that may lead to sub-optimisation. The question that now challenges 
future studies is: 'How can we move the prevailing mind set from “risk averse” safeguarding 
approaches based on mal-applied transactional considerations?' The authors of this study 
propose exposing to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and unnecessary cost) 
they embed through their choice and deployment of imperfect procurement options. Through 
this study, we can already to some extent identify the 'winners and losers' (see Figures 4 and 
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5), but empirical evidence is needed to show clients what it really costs to use the 'prevalent 
coherent construction models'. Figure 6, provides a proposed guide map of how and where 
future studies should start.  
Figure 6: Proposed guide map for future studies 
 
Certainly, Koskela’s (2000) Transformation-Flow-Value (TFV) theory of production has 
helped us to understand and identify many of the causes and origins of waste in construction 
projects, particularly at the project delivery (production) stage. However, it can still be argued 
that waste is created primarily from organisational and contractual problems (Williamson, 
1991); thus focusing on reducing waste from production alone would be insufficient. 
Organisations and contracts are essential parts of the production system design; thus poorly 
aligned (imperfect) governance structures can cause waste (Koskela and Ballard, 2012). 
Nevertheless, this study argued that it is insufficient to expect that the most economic 
transactional arrangements will implicitly lead to the most efficient procurement 
arrangements. Furthermore, the study demonstrated how that an imperfect institutional 
environment can lead to inferior governance systems and structures (e.g. imperfect 
safeguarding procurement arrangements), which may cause transaction and production losses 
(i.e. waste). Waste here can be in the form of monetary, time or effort and can arise ex-ante or 
post-ante. Based on these arguments, the study suggests that in order to start unpicking the 
coherence and yet wastefulness of the current construction business models, there is a need to 
critically evaluate the wider institutional environments surrounding the design and delivery of 
construction and to assess the norms and cultural-cognitive assumptions of the different 
professions within them (see Figure 6). Such an evaluation, however, needs to draw upon 
theory from disciplines outside construction. Three particular theories have been selected by 
this study as fit for the purpose of this evaluation (Figure 7). These are: 
Figure 7: Proposed theoretical research framework for future studies 
 
Building on the five guiding propositions offered in the study by Sarhan et al. (2014) where 
the concept of 'Institutional waste within construction' was introduced, and based on the 
complementary explanations and recommendations presented in this study, further studies are 
recommended to conduct an inductive-deductive grounded theory methodology (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) to explore the phenomenon of coherence within the prevailing construction 
business models, with the aim of investigating the institutional sources of waste in 
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construction. Interviewing is generally the common method used in grounded theory for 
collecting data; however a number of emerging studies have justified the use of interpretative 
case study research in conjunction with the Straussian approach (Pandit, 1996; Halaweh et 
al., 2008; Pan and Tan, 2011). While there is some debate on how to deal with pre-existing 
assumptions  before data collection in grounded theory, like a number of other qualitative 
researchers, the authors of this study are of the view that it is impossible to completely isolate 
theory from research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pink et al., 2010). The use of propositions (guiding 
hypotheses) as a priori specification of constructs, before conducting interviews or case 
studies, as part of a grounded theory methodology, could potentially provide the research 
study with the following advantages (Ali and Birley, 1999): 
 Enabling the researcher to discover issues or effects which have not been considered 
before the investigation began.  
 Providing a guiding focus for the research but also leave the scope open for 
generating unintended findings or even new hypotheses. 
 Allowing the study to makes sense of the disparate information provided by various 
respondents during analysis stages. 
 
The use of the grounded theory methodology could lead to the development of a wider and 
more explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect within the wider aspects of 
construction systems and relationships. The collected data will be coded according to the 
rigorous procedures defined by the Straussian technique (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The 
outcomes of the open, axial and selective coding processes could then be used for presenting 
a theoretical framework for the prescriptive causal analysis of 'institutionalised waste in 
construction'; this could be conducted in a similar manner to the approach initiated by 
Formoso et al. (2015) which  was however limited in their study to a logistical level of 
analysis. It is anticipated that such proposed research project can lead to modifications in 
policy, legalisation and future re-shaping of the roles and responsibilities of the professions 
and wider participants involved within the construction sector in order to increase the 
production efficiency and effectiveness of the industry. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The construction industry is often criticised for its opportunistic, risks averse, adversarial, and 
very competitively cost-driven environment. It has been argued that competition and vested 
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interest absorb a huge proportion of the industry’s intelligence and professional vigour. In 
general, increased collaboration and mutual trust between project parties, to support and 
enhance production flow, is argued to be a suitable remedy for many of the industry’s 
problems. Since the extent of cooperation and trust is mainly influenced by procurement 
arrangements and procedures, this study sought to investigate, through a critical review, how 
construction clients and companies typically protect (safeguard) their project-specific assets 
against opportunism, during procurement procedures. Based on a critical review, this study 
demonstrated how that conventional safeguarding processes adopted by construction clients 
as part of their approach to procurement often complicate the problem rather than solve it. 
Indeed, this study identified a number of imperfect taken for granted safeguarding techniques 
(Table 1) which stifle cooperation, lead to unnecessary costs, and entrench wasteful processes 
across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle. Moreover, this study revealed 
the usefulness of using principles of Lean Construction in association with TCE when 
analysing and deciding on appropriate construction-procurement governance arrangements. 
In particular, the study demonstrated how that when viewing these transactional-based 
safeguarding approaches through a "lean" lens, it can be observed that they are imperfect and 
create waste.  
 
The study offers two main explanations for the prevalence of imperfect construction 
procurement governance arrangements. First, it seems that clients and decision makers, in 
their attempt to overcome the safeguarding problem, mainly focus their attention and efforts 
on reducing ex-ante (i.e. pre-construction phase) transaction costs while giving less attention 
to the impact of their chosen procurement arrangements on ex-post costs. In that way, 
procurement decisions tend to be ultimately focussed on contract administration and shifting 
risks; and, arguably, risk aversion often distracts attention away from core efficiency 
purposes (Williamson, 1985). The second explanation is based on an institutional perspective 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). By putting the safeguarding problem into 
context, it appears that clients conform to imperfect conventional procurement procedures 
due to institutional pressure exerted on them from third parties (e.g. consultants, quantity 
surveyors, lawyers, insurance companies, and banks). Clients rely heavily on professional 
advice from these third parties who may have a vested interest (i.e. social and/or economic 
motivations) for the wide-spread use of these inefficient procurement procedures. These 
institutional factors (See Figure 5) combine to create the coherent current model for 
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construction project delivery and their identification will help the development of more 
efficient and effective business and project delivery models.  
 
There have been moves within the construction industry towards more collaborative 
procurement and project implementation arrangements, however a replicable recipe for 
aligning interests and keeping good intentions in place is still missing. Further studies are, 
therefore, recommended to examine  the roles and responsibilities of the professions and 
wider participants involved within the construction procurement context. Typically those 
professionals do not take a central stake in the project outcome, only a stake in the process by 
which the project is delivered. Do they need to have a bigger stake in the project outcome? 
Can we develop new knowledge and competencies that could enhance in transforming their 
functions, and enable their integration into more collaborative teams? How can we unpick the 
coherent current model? It is proposed that the theoretical research framework and guide map 
for future studies, presented within this study, can lead to the development of prescriptive 
conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of waste in construction. The underlying premise 
is that if we can understand the detailed causes of coherence for the prevailing construction 
business models and reveal the consequential waste, then the adoption of more efficient and 
collaborative business and project delivery models may become more widespread. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmed, S. M., Ahmad, R., and de Saram, D. D. (1999) 'Risk management trends in Hong 
Kong construction industry: A comparison of contractors and owners perceptions' 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 6(3), 256–266. 
Ali, H. and Birley, S. (1999) ‘Integrating deductive and inductive approaches in a study of 
new ventures and customer perceived risk’, Qualitative Market Research: An International 
Journal, Volume, 2(2), 103–110 
Ancell, D (2005) Reducing costs: a practical application of performance-based specification 
and transaction cost theories. In: Khosrowshahi, F (Ed.), 21st Annual ARCOM Conference, 7-
9 September 2005, SOAS, University of London. Association of Researchers in Construction 
Management, 2,  721-729. 
Bradach, J. and Eccles, R. (1989) 'Price, Authority and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural 
Forms', Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 97-118. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) 'Using thematic analysis in psychology', Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101.  
31 
 
Bresnen, M. and Marshall, N. (2000) ‘Partnering in construction: a critical review of issues, 
problems and dilemmas’, Construction Management and Economics, 18, 229–37. 
Bryman, A. (2012) 'Social Research Methods', 4th Edition, New York: Oxford University 
Press 
Chau, K. W. and Walker, A. (1994) ‘Institutional costs and the nature of the subcontracting in 
the construction industry’, CIB W92 Procurement Systems Symposium, Hong Kong, The 
department of Surveying, Hong Kong University 
Clegg, S.R. (1992) 'Contracts cause conflicts', Construction conflict management and 
resolution, P. Fenn and R. Gameso, eds., 128–144. 
Coase, R. (1937) ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, 4(16), 386–405 
Cox, A. and Thompson, I. (1997) ‘Fit for purpose contractual relations: determining a 
theoretical framework for construction projects’, European Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management, 3(3), 127-135 
Cronin, P., Ryan, F., and Coughlan, M. (2008) 'Undertaking a literature review: A step by 
step approach', British Journal of Nursing, 17(1), 38-43 
Cushman, R.F. (2003) ‘Insurance Coverage for Construction Projects' in Construction 
Business Handbook, ASPEN Publishers. Available at: 
http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/articles/Construction%20Business%20Ha
ndbook.ashx 
DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W.W. (1983) ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organizational fields’, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 
147–160. 
Doyle, L.H. (2003) 'Synthesis through meta-ethnography: paradoxes, enhancements, and 
possibilities', Qualitative Research, 3(3), 321-344. 
Egan, J. (1998) Rethinking Construction: Report of the Construction Task Force, London: 
HMSO 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) 'Building theories from case study research', Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. 
Eriksson, P.E. (2006) 'Procurement and governance management – development of a 
conceptual procurement model based on different types of control', Management Review, 
17(1), pp. 30-49. 
Eriksson, P. E., Nilsson, T., Atkin, B. (2008) ‘Client perceptions of barriers to partnering’, 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 15(6), 527 – 539 
32 
 
Eriksson, P.E. and Laan, A. (2007) ‘Procurement effects on trust and control in client-
contractor relationships’, Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 14(4), 
387 – 399 
Eriksson, P. E. and Westerberg, M. (2011) ‘Effects of cooperative procurement procedures 
on construction project performance: A conceptual framework’, International Journal of 
Project Management 29, 197–208 
Formoso, C. , Bølviken, T. , Rooke, J. & Koskela, L. 2015, 'A Conceptual Framework for the 
Prescriptive Causal Analysis of Construction Waste' In:, Seppänen, O., González, V.A. & 
Arroyo, P., 23rd Annual Conference of the International Group for Lean Construction. Perth, 
Australia, 29-31 Jul 2015. pp 454-461 
Gamage, I.S.W., Osmani, M. and Glass, J. (2009), ‘An investigation into the impact of 
procurement systems on waste generation: the contractors' perspective. In: Dainty, A. (Ed) 
Procs 25th Annual ARCOM Conference, 7-9 September 2009, Nottingham, UK, Association 
of Researchers in Construction Management, 1031-40. 
Ghassemi, R. and Becerik-Gerber, B. (2011) ‘Transitioning to integrated project delivery: 
potential barriers and lessons learned’, Lean Construction Journal, Lean and integrated 
project delivery special issue, 32-52 
Greenwood, D. (2001) 'Subcontract procurement: are relationships changing?', Construction 
Management and Economics, 19(1), 5-7 
Guetterman, T. (2015) 'Descriptions of Sampling Practices Within Five Approaches to 
Qualitative Research in Education and the Health Sciences', Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research, 16(2), Art. 25 
Guo, L., Li, H., Li, P., Zhang, C. (2016), 'Transaction costs in construction projects under 
uncertainty', Kybernetes, 45(6), 866 - 883 
Halaweh, M., Fidler, C., and McRobb, S. (2008) 'Integrating the Grounded Theory Method 
and Case Study Research Methodology Within IS Research: A Possible 'Road Map'',  ICIS 
2008 Proceedings, Paper 165. 
Hawkins, R. (2012) ‘How to join the construction industry and survive’, Construction 
Research and Innovation, 3(1), 24-27 
Jaques, R. (2000) 'Construction waste generation - The influence of design and procurement', 
Architectural Science Review, 43(3), 141-146. 
Jones, D. (2000). “Project alliances.” Proc., Conf. on Whose Risk? Managing Risk in 
Construction—Who pays? Association for Project Management Hong Kong, Hong Kong. 
Kent, D. C. and Becerik-Gerber, B. (2010) ‘Understanding Construction Industry Experience 
and Attitudes toward Integrated Project Delivery’, Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 136(8), 815-825 
33 
 
Koskela, L. (2000) An Exploration towards a Production Theory and its Application to 
Construction, Degree of Doctor of Technology, Helsinki University of Technology 
Koskela, L. and Ballard, G. (2006) ‘Should project management be based on theories of 
economics or production?’, Building Research & Information, 34(2), 154-163 
Koskela, L. and Ballard, G. (2012) ‘Is production outside management?’, Building Research 
and Information, 40(6), 724-737 
Koskela, L. and Sharpe, R. (1994) 'Flow process analysis in construction', The 11th 
International Symposium on Automation and Robotics in Construction (ISARC), Brighton, 
U.K., 24 - 26 May, 1994. Elsevier, 281 - 287. 
Kumaraswamy, M. and Dissanayaka, S. (1998) 'Linking procurement systems to project 
priorities', Building Research & Information, 26(4), 223-238 
Krafcik, J. R (1988) ‘Triumph of the Lean Production System’, Sloan Management Review, 
MIT, 41(Fall 1988) 
Laryea, S. and  Hughes, W. (2009) 'Commercial reviews in the tender process of contractors', 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 16(6), 558-572 
Latham, M, (1993) ‘Trust and Money – Interim report of the Joint Government Industry 
Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the United Kingdom Construction 
Industry, London: HMSO 
Latham, M. (1994) ‘Constructing the Team’, London: HMSO 
Li, H., Arditi, D. & Wang, A. (2013) 'Factors That Affect Transaction Costs in Construction 
Projects', Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 139(1), 60-68 
Li, H., Arditi, D. & Wang, A. (2014) 'Transaction costs incurred by construction owners', 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 21(4), 444 - 458 
Lingard, H., Hughes, W., and Chinyio, E. (1998) ‘The impact of contractor selection method 
on transaction costs: a review’, Journal of Construction Procurement, 4(2), 89-102; 
Available at: http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/4289/ 
Love, P., Davis, P., Ellis, J., and Cheung, S. (2010) ‘A systemic view of dispute causation’, 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business’, 3(4), 661-680 
Love, P., Skitmore, M., and Earl, G. (1998) ‘Selecting a suitable procurement method for a 
building project’, Construction Management and Economics, 16(2), 221-233 
Mante, J., Ndekugri, I., Ankrah., N. and Hammond, F. (2012) ‘The influence of procurement 
methods on dispute resolution mechanism choice in construction’ In: Smith, S.D (Ed) Procs 
28th Annual ARCOM Conference, 3-5 September 2012, Edinburgh, UK, Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 979-988. 
34 
 
Matthews, O., Howell, G., and Mitropoulos, P. (2003) ‘Aligning the lean organization: a 
contractual approach’, Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of the International Group 
for Lean Construction. Virginia, USA 
McNeil, I.R. (1985) 'Relational Contracting: What we do and do not know', Wisconsin Law 
Review, 5, 483-525 
Mossman, A., Ballard. G, Pasquire, C. (2010) 'Lean project delivery - innovation in 
integrated design and delivery', Draft paper available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264829692_Lean_Project_Delivery__innovation_in
_integrated_design__delivery 
Ndekugri, I., Daeche, H., and Zhou, D. (2013) ‘The Project Insurance Option in 
Infrastructure Procurement’, Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 
20(3), 267-289 
Newell, R. and Burnard, P. (2006) Research for Evidence-Based Practice, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing 
 
North, D. (1994) ‘Economic performance through time’, The American Economic Review, 
84(3), 359-368. Also published as Nobel Prize lecture, available at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html 
 
Ohno, T. (1988) ‘Workplace Management’, Productivity Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA 
Oliver, C. (1991) ‘Strategic responses to institutional processes', Academy of Management 
Review, 16, 145–179 
Osipova, E. and Eriksson, P E. (2011) ‘How Procurement Options Influence Risk 
management in Construction Projects’, Construction Management and Economics, 29(11), 
1149-1158 
Oyegoke, A., Dickinson, M., Khalfan, M., McDermott, P., and Rowlinson, S. (2009) 
‘Construction project procurement routes: an in depth critique’, International Journal of 
Managing Projects in Business, 2(3), 338 - 354 
Pan, S. and Tan, B. (2011) ' Demystifying case research: A structured–pragmatic–situational 
(SPS) approach to conducting case studies', Information and Organization, 21, 161–176 
Pandit, N. (1996) 'The Creation of Theory: A Recent Application of the Grounded Theory 
Method', The Qualitative Report, (2)4, 1-15 
Patton, M. Q. (2015) Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and 
practice (4th ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pekuri, L., Pekuri, A., and Haapasalo, H. (2014) 'Analysing the Problem of Procurement in 
Construction', In:, Kalsaas, B.T., Koskela, L. & Saurin, T.A., 22nd Annual Conference of the 
International Group for Lean Construction, Oslo, Norway, 25-27 Jun 2014. pp 39-50 
35 
 
Pink, S., Tutt , D., Dainty, A., and Gibb, A. (2010) ‘Ethnographic methodologies for 
construction research: knowing, practice and interventions’, Building Research & 
Information, 38(6), 647-659 
Rahman, M. M., and Kumaraswamy, M. M. (2002a) 'Joint risk management through 
transactionally efficient relational contracting', Construction Management and Economics, 
20(1), 45–54. 
Rahman, M. M., and Kumaraswamy, M. M. (2002b) 'Risk management trends in the 
construction industry: Moving towards joint risk management', Engineering, Construction 
and Architectural Management, 9(2), 131–151 
Rahman, M. and Kumaraswamy, M. (2004) 'Contracting Relationship: Trends and 
Transitions', Journal of Management in Engineering, 20(4), 147-161 
Rajeh, M., Tookey, J., and Rotimi, J. (2015) 'Estimating transaction costs in the New Zealand 
construction procurement', Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 22(2), 
242 - 267 
Rameezdeen, R and Rodrigo, A (2013) ‘Textual complexity of standard conditions used in 
the construction industry’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building, 
13(1) 1-12 
Rameezdeen, R. and Rajapakse, C. (2007) Contract interpretation: the impact of readability, 
Construction Management and Economics, 25(7), 729-737 
Rindfleisch, A. and Heide, J. (1997) ‘Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future 
Applications’, The Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30-54 
Rooke, J., Seymour, D. and Fellows, R. (2004) 'Planning for claims: An ethnography of 
industry culture', Construction Management and Economics, 22(6), 655-662 
Sarhan, S. and Fox, A. (2013) ‘Barriers to Implementing Lean Construction in the UK 
Construction Industry’, The Built & Human Environment Review, 6, 1-17 
Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., and King, A. (2014) ‘Institutional waste within the construction 
industry: An outline’, In: Kalsaas, B.T., Koskela, L. & Saurin, T.A., 22nd Annual Conference 
of the International Group for Lean Construction, Oslo, Norway, 25-27 Jun 2014, pp. 895-
906 
Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., Manu, E., and King, A. (2016)  'Are Tier 1 Contractors Making 
Their Money Out of Wasteful Procurement Arrangements?' In:, 24th Annual Conference of 
the International Group for Lean Construction, Boston, USA, 20-22, Jul 2016. 
Sebastian,  R. (2011) 'Changing roles of the clients, architects and contractors through BIM',  
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 18(2),176 - 187 
36 
 
Sidwell, A.C. and Budiawan, D. (2001) The significance of the tendering contract on the 
opportunities for clients to encourage contractor-led innovation, Construction Innovation 
2001, 1, 107-116 
Smith, G. and Bohn, C. (1999) ‘Small to medium contractor contingency and assumption of 
risk’, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125(2), 101-108 
Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. (1998) Basics of Qualitative research techniques and Procedures 
for Developing Grounded Theory, USA: Sage 
Tate, W., Ellram, L., Dooley, K. (2014) ‘The impact of transaction costs and institutional 
pressure on supplier environmental practices’, International Journal of Physical Distribution 
& Logistics Management, 44(5), 353-372 
Thomas, J. and Harden, A. (2008) 'Methods for the thematic synthesis of qualitative research 
in systematic reviews', BMC Medical Research Methodology, (8)45 
Thomsen, C., Darrington, J., Dunne, D. and Lichtig, W. (2010) ‘Managing integrated project 
delivery’, CMAA, McLean, VA. 
Ting, S., Chen, C., and Bartholomew, D. (2007) ‘An Integrated Study of Entrepreneurs’ 
Opportunism’, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 22(5), 322-335 
Tookey, J., Murray, M., Hardcastle, C., and Langford, D. (2001) ‘Construction procurement 
routes: redefining the contours of construction procurement’, Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management, 8(1), 20 – 30 
Vilasini, N., Neitzert, T. and  Rotimi, J. (2011) ‘Correlation between Construction 
Procurement Methods and Lean Principles’, International Journal of Construction 
Management, 11(4), 65-78 
Walker, A. and Wing, C. K. (1999) ‘The relationship between construction project 
management theory and transaction cost economics’, Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management, 6(2), 166-176 
Walker, D., Davis, P., and Stevenson, A. (2017) 'Coping with uncertainty and ambiguity 
through team collaboration in infrastructure projects', International Journal of Project 
Management, 35 (2017), 180-190 
Wang, X. and Yang, Z. (2013) ‘Inter-firm opportunism: a meta-analytic review and 
assessment of its antecedents and effect on performance’, Journal of Business and Industrial 
Marketing, 28(2), 137-146 
Watermeyer, R. (2011) ‘A framework for developing construction procurement strategy’, 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Management, procurement, and Law, 
165(4), 223-237 
37 
 
Williamson, M. Wilson, O.D., Skitmore, R.M., and Runeson, G. (2004) Client abuses of the 
competitive tendering system: Some generic principles and a case study, Journal of 
Construction Research, 5(1), 61-74 
Williamson, O.E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York: The Free Press 
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting, New York: The Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1990) 'A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic 
Organization', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 146(1), 61-71 
Williamson, O.E. (1991) ‘Strategizing, economizing, and economic organization’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 12(Winter), 75–94 
Williamson, O.E. (2000) The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead, 
Journal of Economics Literature, 38(3), (Sep., 2000), 595-613  
Winch G. (1989) 'The construction firm and the construction project: a transaction cost 
approach', Construction Management and Economics, 7, 331-345. 
Wordley, P. (1991) 'Protecting the building owner and occupier – latent defects insurance or 
collateral warranties?', Property Management, 9(3), 234 - 240 
Xue, X.,  Shen, Q,. and Ren, Z. (2010) 'Critical Review of Collaborative Working in 
Construction Projects: Business Environment and Human Behaviors', Journal of 
Management in Engineering, 26(4), 196-208 
Zaghloul, R. and Hartman, F. (2003) ‘Construction contracts: the cost of mistrust’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 21, 419-424 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Appendix 1: A snapshot of Table of information developed for literature review purposes 
Study Research Method Main aim(s) of the study Imperfections within the construction procurement context 
Love et al. 
(1998) 
 
A postal questionnaire 
distributed to a variety 
of personnel involved 
in the procurement 
process (41 clients and 
35 consultants). 
To obtain the experience of 
and attitudes to a variety of 
procurement methods and the 
criteria used for selection. 
The establishment of a parochial (close-minded) approach to 
procurement utilisation by experienced clients, which is based 
on familiarity rather than appropriateness – A “habituation” 
approach  
Traditional cost re-imbursement method – this was identified 
by survey-respondents as the least appropriate form of 
procurement 
Architects’ and quantity surveyors’ have a vested interest and 
bias for the use of traditional lump sum and traditional lump 
sum with provisional quantities.  
Clients’ reliance on (biased) dependent consultants’ decisions 
for the selection of procurement - consultants may have vested 
interest for the use of traditional procurement routes 
Wordley 
(1991) 
Literature review/ 
opinion based 
To examine the respective 
concepts of both collateral 
warranties and Latent defects 
insurance with a view to 
highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of each 
arrangement. 
Collateral warranties – vagaries of litigation together with its 
transactional cost, delay and substantial demands on 
management time; uncertainty about the performance of the 
asset backing the warranty; increases the overall cost of the 
insurance on any one project; hinders collaboration and 
encourages disputes 
Eriksson 
and Laan 
(2007) 
A survey of 87 
Swedish construction 
clients 
To analyse how the choices 
made by clients during the 
buying process stages affect 
the combination of 
governance mechanisms and 
control types in client-
contractor relationship. 
Clients’ procurement decisions establish governance forms that 
facilitate a focus on price through output control, and authority 
through process control. Trust-breeding procedures entailing 
social control are seldom used. 
Comprehensive specification made by the client before the 
contractor is procured - results in a divorce between design and 
construction. 
Bid invitation through open bid procedures - results in many 
hours spent on design, planning and calculations that are never 
used, causing waste and non-value adding costs. Additionally, 
the constant replacement of actors creates inefficiencies, since a 
new learning curve must be climbed by the supplier each time. 
The focus on low tender price during bid evaluation 
Construction actors rely heavily on contract formalization 
through standard forms of contracts - which are instruments 
seeking strict liability and attaching blame to events that occur, 
encouraging non-collaborative behaviour and driving distance 
between the parties - the common use of standard contracts in 
construction is only harmful if they are used as safeguards in 
the absence of relational norms. 
Output-based compensation (fixed price) is inappropriate - 
because uncertainties in construction are high - output control 
through fixed prices may lead to inflexibility since the supplier 
may resist adapting to changed circumstances 
The heavy reliance on output control in performance evaluation  
No or low usage of collaborative use in traditional projects - 
results in increased need for output and process control, 
indicating emphasis on price and authority. Examples of 
collaborative tools include: establishment of joint objectives 
and continuous evaluation of them, joint project office, shared 
IT-supported database, teambuilding events and dispute 
resolution techniques 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1: A conceptual model of transactional governance problems and solutions 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2. The “Buy or Make” decision factors 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Eriksson's (2006) TCE-based procurement model for governance choice  
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: General potential impacts of the use of imperfect safeguarding approaches on 
project performance and outcomes -Modified from  Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Institutional  factors influencing the choice of imperfect procurement arrangements  
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Figure 6: Proposed guide map for future studies 
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 7: Proposed theoretical research framework for future studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
